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Abstract
This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert
and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a dis-
crete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic
mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into
the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communica-
tion, however, only if some information transmission is possible with
unmediated communication.
JEL classications: C72, D82, D83
Keywords: Communication, Information, Cheap talk, Mediation
1 Introduction
Recent research has shown that a strategic mediator can improve upon com-
munication in a Crawford Sobel (1982) setting, if his and the experts bias
point into opposite directions. Ivanov (2010) demonstrates that communi-
cation between a positively biased expert and the decision maker can be
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improved by a strategic mediator with negative bias. In fact, a strategic me-
diator with a specic negative bias can achieve as much information trans-
mission in equilibrium as the optimal non-strategic mediator characterized
by Goltsman et al. (2009). Ivanov (2010) also shows that, when the media-
tor is either unbiased or biased into the same direction as the expert, but to
a lesser degree, the mediator cannot improve upon direct communication.1
This leaves open the question, however, whether a mediator with a stronger
bias in the same direction as the expert may improve communication.
We show that, even when the biases point into the same direction, a
strategic mediator can improve communication. We give an example that is
kept as simple as possible to make this point. The mediators bias is his pri-
vate information and may either be zero (so that the mediator is unbiased)
or greater than the bias of the expert. This introduces an uncertainty on
the decision makers side about the experts message, even when all players
play pure strategies.2 As shown by Ambrus, Azevedo, and Kamada (2010),
some uncertainty about the experts message is needed to improve informa-
tion transmission. Whereas in Ivanov (2010) and in Ambrus, Azevedo, and
Kamada (2010) the uncertainty arises from a mixed equilibrium strategy of
the mediator, in our setup it arises from the decision makers uncertainty
about the mediators type. This allows us to focus on pure strategies and
simplies the equilibrium analysis. We nd that the mediator can improve
communication, but interestingly only if some information transmission is
possible under direct communication.3
1Closely related are two recent papers. Ambrus, Azevedo, and Kamada (2010) consider
a chain of strategic mediators, and give a su¢ cient condition for when a mediator improves
communication in a fairly general setup. Ambrus, Azevedo, Kamada, and Katagi (2010)
consider the open versus the closed rule in congressional decision making. They argue that,
if communication between a legislature and a biased lobbyist is mediated by a committee,
and the open rule is used, then the legislature will prefer a committee with a bias opposite
to the lobbyists.
2Li and Madarasz (2007) show that not revealing the mediators type can increase
information transmission in mediated communication.
3The su¢ cient condition for when a mediator improves communication given by Am-
brus, Azevedo, and Kamada (2010) applies to settings where, whithout a mediator, there
is only a babbling equilibrium and no information is transmitted. Our results thus point
out that a mediator may improve communication under wider circumstances.
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2 Model
Nature chooses the state of the world  from the uniform distribution over
the set f0; 1; 2; 3g :4 The expert learns  and sends a message s 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g
to the mediator. The mediator learns s (but not ) and sends a message
m 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g to the decision maker. Finally, the decision maker observes
m (but neither s nor ) and chooses an action a 2 R: The payo¤s of the
expert, mediator, and decision maker are, respectively,
uE =   (a  ( + b))2 ;
uM =   (a  ( + bM))2 ;
uD =   (a  )2 :
The bias of the expert b is strictly positive and commonly known. The bias
of the mediator bM is his private information and takes value bM = 0 with
probability p 2 (0; 1) and bM =  > 0 with probability 1   p: Note that
the biases of the expert and the mediator point into the same direction.
Without loss of generality, we focus on equilibria where di¤erent messages
of the expert which are sent with positive probability in equilibrium lead to
di¤erent probability distributions over actions.5
2.1 Unmediated communication
As a benchmark, consider the case of unmediated communication between
the decision maker and the expert. For this case, it is straightforward to show
the following: If b < 1=2; a fully revealing equilibrium exists. If 1=2 < b < 1;
the optimal (i.e., most informative) equilibrium is a 2-action equilibrium
where type  = 0 reveals his type truthfully, thereby separating himself from
all the other types, and the other types pool on some other message. If b > 1;
only a babbling equilibrium exists and no information is transmitted.6
4For simplicity, we consider a discrete environment. The logic of our argument, however,
does not depend on this. It will become clear below that we need at least four di¤erent
states of the world to make our point.
5For any equilibrium where di¤erent messages of the expert lead to the same probabil-
ity distribution over actions there exists an outcome equivalent equilibrium where these
messages are replaced by one and the same message.
6See Appendix A.1 for a proof of these statements.
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2.2 Mediated communication
Ivanov (2010) shows that a strategic mediator whose bias points into the
opposite direction as the experts bias can ensure as much information trans-
mission as an optimally chosen unstrategic mediator even if the experts bias
is so large that, in direct communication, only the babbling equilibrium would
exist. In our setting, however, in which the mediators and the experts bi-
ases point into the same direction, introducing the mediator cannot improve
upon the babbling equilibrium. This is especially interesting since, as we
will show below, the mediator in our setting can improve upon equilibria in
which there is some information transmitted in direct communication.
Proposition 1 If no information can be transmitted by direct communica-
tion between the decision maker and the expert, then no information can be
transmitted by mediated communication either.
The intuition behind this result is the following.7 Suppose that some
information can be transmitted with mediated communication. Then there
exists an equilibrium of the mediated communication game where the expert
of type  = 0 separates himself, while the higher types  = 1; 2; 3 pool.
In this equilibrium, the mediator will send only two messages with positive
probability. Similarly the decision maker takes only two di¤erent actions with
positive probability. Hence we call the equilibrium a 2-action equilibrium.
(See Figure 1 for an illustration of this and the subsequent argument.)
In order to improve communication if direct talk amounts only to babbling
(i.e. if b > 1), the mediator has to make sure that the lowest type prefers
revealing his type over pooling with the others. Thus, the mediator must
reduce the lowest types incentive to exaggerate .
Consider the 2-action equilibrium. After receiving the message that re-
veals type  = 0, the mediator will either pass on this information, inducing
a low action of zero (if he is unbiased), or else will distort the message up-
wards, inducing a higher action (if he is biased). Thus, if the expert of the
lowest type reports truthfully to the mediator, he thereby chooses a lottery
combined of the low and the high action. If, instead, he exaggerates his
type, he gets the high action with certainty. Thus, he reveals his type to the
mediator only if he prefers the low action over the high action.
7See Appendix A.2 for a proof based on this intuition.
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Note that the low action is exactly the same as the one that the decision
maker would choose in an equilibrium of the direct communication game in
which the lowest type of the expert is revealed - namely zero. The high
action, however, is lower than the one that the decision maker would choose
in a 2-action equilibrium of the direct communication game. This is due
to the fact that in the 2-action equilibrium of the mediated communication
game, the high message is less credible than in the 2-action equilibrium of
the direct communication game. This, in its turn, is because in the mediated
communication game, the high message could come from a biased mediator
who exaggerates the type of the expert when in truth  = 0.
Given the concavity of the experts preferences, the above considerations
imply that if a 2-action equilibrium of the mediated communication game
exists, then there is also a 2-action equilibrium of the direct communication
game. Thus, the mediator cannot improve communication whenever b > 1
so that direct talk amounts only to babbling.
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Figure 1: Direct communication versus mediated communication
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However, when there exists an equilibrium of the direct communication
game in which at least some information is transmitted, having the mediator
may improve communication:
Proposition 2 Suppose that 1=2 < b < b  0:656: Then there exists a pos-
itive measure set of parameters (; p) with  > b and p 2 (0; 1) such that
mediation improves information transmission, compared to direct communi-
cation.
Note that for 1=2 < b < b, where b ' 0:65, the 2-action equilibrium of the
direct communication game exists and is the most informative equilibrium.
To prove that strategic mediation can improve information transmission, we
show that there exists a 3-action equilibrium of the mediated communication
game.
The equilibrium strategies are as follows (see Figure 2): Type  = 0 of
the expert sends a message s0;  = 1 sends a di¤erent message s1; and 2 and
3 pool on a third message s23: The unbiased type of the mediator truthfully
reports what he has received. The biased mediator distorts communication
upwards: after seeing s0; he reports s1; and after seeing s1 or s23; he reports
s23.
Given these strategies, the decision maker infers from s0 that  = 0 and
thus chooses action a1 = 0. After receiving s1; the decision maker believes
that  = 0 with probability 1  p and  = 1 with probability p, so he chooses
a2 = p. After observing s23; the decision maker believes that  = 1 with
probability (1  p) = (3  p) ; and that  = 2 and  = 3 with probability
1= (3  p) each. His choice of action in this case is a3 = (6  p) = (3  p) :
It is straightforward to show that for any b 2  1
2
;b

; these strategies are
an equilibrium for a set of parameters (; p) with positive measure.8 (One
example is p =  = 0:9 and b = 0:6:) The expected payo¤ of the decision
maker in this equilibrium is
 1
4
 
2 (1  p) p2 + (1  p)

6  p
3  p   1
2
+

6  p
3  p   2
2
+

6  p
3  p   3
2!
  1
2
(1)
8See Appendix A.3.
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Figure 2: Best equilibrium of the mediated communication game
Thus, the decision maker gets a higher payo¤ in this equilibrium than in the
2-action equilibrium of the direct communication game, in which his payo¤
amounts to
 1
4
 
0 + (1  2)2 + 0 + (3  2)2 =  1
2
:
We conclude that a strategic mediator with a positive bias - a bias point-
ing into the same direction as the experts - can improve information trans-
mission, but only if some information can already be transmitted via direct
communication between the expert and the decision maker. The reason for
this is the following: In order to give the lowest type of the expert an incentive
to report honestly, the mediator has to make it more attractive for this type
to reveal himself to the mediator (revelation) than to mimic the next-highest
type (deviation). To achieve this, the mediator must make sure that (1) he
moves to the right the action that the expert of type 0 expects in response
to a revelation, and (2) that the decision makers expected reactions to the
revelation and to the deviation, respectively, are not two linear combinations
of the same actions. Instead, the lottery of actions that the expert of type
 = 0 triggers by deviation must include some action a0 that is higher than
7
any possible action that the decision maker would choose after a revelation.
If a0 is su¢ ciently high, this guarantees that mimicking the next-highest type
becomes less attractive to the expert with  = 0 than revealing his true type.
Thus, the biased mediator has to distort both messages upwards: the one
that reveals the lowest type of the expert and the next highest one. This,
however, can only be done if there are at least three di¤erent messages sent
by the expert in equilibrium, i.e. only if the mediated communication game
has an equilibrium with at least three actions.
If the expert has a bias b > 1, however, this is not possible. Thus, a
strategic mediator with a positive bias can improve information transmission
if the starting-point is a 2-action equilibrium of the direct communication
game; but he cannot improve things if the starting point is a situation in
which only the babbling equilibrium exists under direct communication.
3 Conclusion
Although our setting is extremely simple, it provides two important insights.
The rst insight is that a strategic mediator with a positive bias can im-
prove communication - although for this to hold, at least some information
transmission must already be possible via direct communication. The second
insight concerns the relative intensities of the conicts between the decision
maker, the strategic mediator, and the expert: For the mediator to improve
information transmission in Ivanov (2010), the conict between the mediator
and the expert must be more intensive than the conict between the expert
and the decision maker. In our setting, by contrast, the conict between
the mediator and the expert must be less intensive than the conict between
the mediator and the decision maker. This suggests that for any strategic
mediator to improve communication, this mediator must be somewhat more
extreme than the two parties whose conict he is to alleviate: Either he must
be more extreme than the decision maker (as in Ivanov (2010)), or he must
be more extreme than the expert (as in our setting). We leave it to future
research to explore this in a more general setting.
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A Appendix
A.1 Unmediated communication
We start by showing two standard properties in our context.
Lemma 1 Suppose that types  and 0 >  send the same message s: Then
any 00 with  < 00 < 0 also send s:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that 00 sends a message s00 6= s: Denote
the action take by the decision maker after observing s by a; and the action
taken after observing s00 by a00: Suppose that a < 00 + b: Then a00 > a since
type 00 prefers a00: Moreover, a00 cannot be too far to the right of 00+ b. But
then 0 prefers a00 over a; a contradiction. The remaining cases can be ruled
out similarly.
Lemma 1 implies that, in any equilibrium, the set of experts types is
partitioned into cells, and types in the same cell send the same message. We
call the di¤erence between the highest and the lowest type belonging to the
same cell the length of the cell.
Lemma 2 In the most informative equilibrium, the length of the cells of the
partition is weakly increasing.
Proof. To prove this, it is su¢ cient to rule out the following three possibil-
ities. (i) Types 0 and 1 pool, while types 2 and 3 send separate messages.
Then we must have b  1=2; for otherwise 2 would have an incentive to imi-
tate 3: But then a fully separating equilibrium exists. (ii) Types 1 and 2 pool,
while types 0 and 3 send separate messages each. Then b  1=4, otherwise
2 prefers to imitate 3; and again a fully separating equilibrium exists. (iii)
Types 0; 1; and 2 pool while type 3 separates himself. This cannot be an
equilibrium since for any b > 0; type 2 prefers to imitate type 3:
We are now in a position to consider the most informative equilibrium.
It is straightforward that, whenever b < 1=2; there is a fully revealing equi-
librium. If 1=2 < b < 1; there is no equilibrium where types 0 and 1 send
separate messages which fully reveal their respective types, since then type
0 would prefer to imitate type 1. In particular, there is no fully separating
equilibrium. Moreover, there is no equilibrium where 0 and 1 pool on some
message s while 2 and 3 pool on a di¤erent message s0 6= s; since type 1 would
prefer to send s0: However, there is an equilibrium where type 0 separates
9
himself and types 1; 2, and 3 pool. By Lemma 2, it follows that this is the
most informative equilibrium. Finally, if b > 1; this equilibrium breaks down
since type 0 would prefer to imitate the others. Hence there is no information
transmission in equilibrium.
A.2 Mediation does not improve communication if b >
1
Call an equilibrium a n-action equilibrium if the decision makers takes n
di¤erent actions with positive probability on the equilibrium path. The fol-
lowing lemma is the key step in our argument.
Lemma 3 Suppose that without mediation there is no 2-action equilibrium.
Then with mediation there is no 2-action equilibrium either.
Proof. Suppose that with mediation there is a 2-action equilibrium. There
is a critical type 0 such that in the supposed equilibrium, all   0 send the
same lowmessage, and all  > 0 send the same highmessage. (This
can be shown by essentially the same argument as in the proof of Lemma
1, replacing actions by certainty equivalents of the lotteries over actions in-
duced by messages of the expert.) Furthermore, the mediator cannot report
truthfully always because then a 2-action equilibrium would exist without
mediation as well. The unbiased mediator never has an incentive to distort
the message. The biased mediator will distort the message, if at all, only
upwards. Thus, in the supposed equilibrium the mediator reports truthfully
if he is unbiased, and always sends the high message when he is biased.
When the decision maker receives the low message from the mediator, he
knows that   0 and chooses his action equal to the average of these types,
i.e.
al =
1
0 + 1
0X
=0
:
When the decision maker receives the high message from the mediator, he
chooses some action ah which is strictly in between al and the average of the
types of the expert that send the high message:
al < ah <
1
4  0
4X
=0+1

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Consider the critical type 0 in this equilibrium. By assumption, without
mediation there is no 2-action equilibrium where types   0 send a low
message and all others a high message. This implies that type 0 strictly
prefers 1
4 0
P4
=0+1  over al: By concavity of the payo¤ functions, 
0 strictly
prefers ah over al: But with mediation, 
0 can induce ah by sending the high
message, contradicting equilibrium.
Whenever an n action equilibrium exists where n > 2; there exists also
a 2-action equilibrium. Thus Lemma 3 implies that, whenever without me-
diation there is only a babbling equilibrium, mediation cannot improve upon
communication.
A.3 Mediated communication in the case 1=2 < b < 1
Here we give the conditions under which the equilibrium described in the full
text exists.
The decision maker Given the strategies of the other players and
updating of believes by Bayesrule, the decision makers actions are optimal
by construction.
The mediator First, consider the mediator with bias bM = . If he
receives message s0; and his utility from reporting m1 must be greater than
his utility from either reporting m0 or m23 :
  (p  )2   2
  (p  )2   

6  p
3  p   
2
Solving these inequalities for ; we have   p=2 and
  1
2

p+
6  p
3  p

: (2)
If the mediator with bias  receives message m1; he should prefer sending
m23 over sending m1 :
 

6  p
3  p   (1 + )
2
   (p  (1 + ))2
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or equivalently
  1
2

p+
6  p
3  p

  1: (3)
If inequality (3) holds, then he also has no incentive to send m0: Note (3)
implies that   p=2:
If the mediator with bias  receives messagem23; he should prefer sending
m23 over sending m1 :
 

6  p
3  p  

5
2
+ 
2
  

p 

5
2
+ 
2
or
  1
2

p+
6  p
3  p

  5
2
which is implied by (3). A fortiori, the mediator has no incentive to send m0:
Second, consider the unbiased mediator. After receiving message s0; he
gets his ideal point by truthful reporting. After receiving message s1; he
clearly has no incentive to send m0; and he also has no incentive to send m23
(after all, in this situation, even the biased mediator prefers m1 over m23).
If he receives s23; he should prefer sending m23 over sending m0 or m1. This
is clearly true since
0 < p <
6  p
3  p <
5
2
:
To summarize, if (2) and (3) hold, the mediator has no incentive to devi-
ate.
The expert Consider type  = 0 of the expert. He has no incentive to
send s1 whenever
 pb2   (1  p) (p  b)2   p (p  b)2   (1  p)

6  p
3  p   b
2
or equivalently
b  1
4
36  48p+ 4p2 + 23p3   13p4 + 2p5
9  18p+ 17p2   7p3 + p4 (4)
Clearly, deviating s23 is worse than deviating to s1:
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Consider type  = 1 of the expert. Sending s1 is better than sending s0:
Moreover, he has no incentive to report s23 whenever
  (p  (1 + b))2   

6  p
3  p   (1 + b)
2
or
b  1
2

p+
6  p
3  p

  1: (5)
From (5) and (3), we have   b:
Consider type  = 2 of the expert. He has no incentive to send s1 (and a
fortiori s0) whenever
 

6  p
3  p   (2 + b)
2
   (p  (2 + b))2
or
b  1
2

p+
6  p
3  p

  2
which is true for any b > 0:
Similarly, type  = 3 has no incentive to deviate either.
Figure 3 below plots the right hand sides of (4) and (5) as a function of
p. Assuming b > 0:5; the inequalities hold in the area under the two curves
and above the straight line.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
b
Figure 3: Right hand side of (4) and (5) as a function of p:
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A.4 On inequality (1)
Here we plot the left hand side of inequality (1):
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
p
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